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Yehoshua Ozjasz Th on studied philosophy in Berlin in 1891–1895. In par-
ticular, he attended classes conducted by Georg Simmel (philosopher and so-
ciologist), Friedrich Paulsen (philosopher) and Adolph Wagner (sociologist, 
economist). Simmel became Th on’s principal intellectual mentor. Simmel 
was one of the leading representatives of Neo-Kantianism in Germany, but 
he was also quite strongly infl uenced by American pragmatism. Th on ob-
tained his PhD on the basis of the study Die Grundprinzipien der kantischen 
Moralphilosophie in ihrer Entwicklung;1 this topic was suggested to him by 
Simmel, who was more interested in practical and ethical issues than theo-
retical ones. In this work, Th on argues that Kant represented eudaimonism 
(the doctrine that happiness is the summum bonum – the highest goodness) 
before his critical ethics, that is, ethical theory derived from the principles of 
reine Vernunft ; Kant’s mature ethical views, based on the categorical impera-
tive, are displayed in the Critique of Pure Reason, one of his principal books, 
published in 1788. 
In 1897, Th on graduated from the rabbinic school in Berlin. He sacrifi ced 
his later years entirely to Jewish life.2 Although Th on himself never returned 
to his PhD dissertation and its problem, one can ask whether Kantian motifs 
could be found in his Judaic teaching. Th e answer can only be hypothetical, 
because Th on did not refer to Kant in his later writings. However, it seems 
that some Kantian motifs are present in Th on’s sermons. Clearly, Th on as 
a rabbi justifi ed his ethical recommendations with the Torah and Talmud, 
that is, the most sacred sources of Judaism. However, when he stressed the 
internality of morality, the externality of civil law, moral autonomy of the 
individual, good will or freedom, these points are very close to Kant’s ethical 
1 Ozjasz Th on, Die Grundprinzipien der kantischen Moralphilosophie in ihrer Entwicklung 
(Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1895).
2 Details are presented in other papers in this volume.
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doctrine. Th on’s frequent pronouncements about heaven with stars and mor-
al rules inside human beings are strongly reminiscent of Kant’s famous state-
ment about two things deserving wonder, namely the starry heaven above me 
and moral rule inside me. In general, it seems that Th on’s progressive Judaism 
had some affi  nities with Protestant pietism – that is, the religious atmosphere 
in which Kant grew up. 
Georg Simmel and Adolph Wagner considered Th on to be a very gift ed 
and promising scholar. Both Th on’s principal teachers insisted that he should 
continue his academic career; Wagner pressed Th on to write a Habilitationss-
chrift . Th on probably considered this eventuality quite seriously, as it is docu-
mented by his paper “Th e Present State of Sociology in Germany.”3 Th is work 
was possibly a step toward Th on’s continuation of his scholarly development. 
However, since he decided to devote himself entirely to Judaism, Zionism 
and Jewish problems, he withdrew from academic activities. Th on’s critical 
monograph about the evolutionary philosophy and sociology of Herbert 
Spencer, published in Hebrew in 1910, was his last episode in the domain of 
social theory. Incidentally, it is not surprising that Kant’s follower had a quite 
negative attitude toward naturalistic and utilitarian moral philosophy based 
on evolutionism.
Th e American Journal of Sociology was established by Albion W. Small in 
1895. It was the fi rst professional journal in sociology (one year before L’An-
née Sociologique created by Émile Durkheim in France). Th e journal was (and 
still is) published by the University of Chicago, where Small established the 
fi rst professional department of sociology in 1892. He was a student of Sim-
mel in Berlin, and it is quite possible that Small and Th on met in Germany. 
Sociology made its fi rst steps in USA just aft er the industrial revolution in 
this country following the Civil War. Th e fi rst American sociologists were 
strongly infl uenced by the pragmatism of William James and Charles Sanders 
Peirce. Th is philosophy, adopting practical criteria as the ultimate measure 
of truth and scientifi c correctness, formed a good theoretical environment 
for sociology, particularly for empirical research. Let me mention that prag-
matism was particularly strong in Chicago thanks to John Dewey, associated 
with the University of Chicago from 1894. Simmel himself was very sympa-
thetic to this approach to sociology. On the other hand, Small was against 
the splendid (or non-splendid, if you like) isolation of American thought. 
His idea was to organise the American Journal of Sociology as a forum of in-
ternational exchange of sociological views and concrete investigations. Th is 
3 Ozjasz Th on, “Th e Present State of Sociology in Germany”, American Journal of Sociol-
ogy, vol. 2, no. 4 (January 1897): 567−588; ibid., vol. 2, no. 5 (March 1897): 718−736; ibid., vol. 
2, no. 6 (May 1897): 792−800.
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explains why Small published reports about the state of sociology in other 
countries. Giuseppe Flamingo reported on sociology in Italy in volume 1, is-
sue 3 (1895), and James H. Tutts published a paper on sociology in France in 
volume 1, issue 4 (1896). Furthermore, Simmel’s important methodological 
study on superiority and subordination as the subject of sociology appeared 
in volume 2 (1896). 
Due to his studies in Berlin, a paper about German sociology became one 
of the priorities of Small as the editor of American Journal of Sociology. He 
probably asked Simmel to select an author suffi  ciently competent to write an 
essay about sociology in Germany. Simmel recommended Th on, who agreed 
to write a report on German sociology. Th is choice additionally demonstrat-
ed that Th on was considered a serious scholar just aft er his PhD. Certainly, 
the invitation to publish a paper in the American Journal of Sociology was 
very prestigious. Th e proposal was fairly demanding, because Small had 
a very good knowledge of German sociological works. Th on wrote the paper 
in German, and Small translated it into English. Th on’s study is the longest 
of all devoted to foreign sociology. Th e paper has 50 pages altogether, almost 
twice as many as the aforementioned studies about Italy and France. Th is cir-
cumstance demonstrates how Small was interested in having something fair-
ly extensive about German sociology in his journal. It is quite possible that 
Th on prepared his study for the American Journal of Sociology related to his 
Habilitationsschrift . It is perhaps symbolic that the third part of “Th e Present 
State of Sociology in Germany” appeared in May 1897, by which time Th on’s 
graduation at the Berlin rabbinic school had taken place, or was about to.
In order to understand Th on’s presentation of German sociology in 
the two last decades of the 19th century, we need to take into account two 
principal trends in the humanities and social sciences (the latter label was 
practically not used) in the second half of the 19th century. Two traditions 
in this respect are to be distinguished. Firstly, there was the French-English 
approach, with August Comte and John Stuart Mill as the main representa-
tives; Spencer can also be counted as a very important person in this brand. 
Comte’s methodology (he invented the label “sociology”) placed sociology as 
the last element in the hierarchy of theoretical sciences: mathematics, astron-
omy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology. Th is sequence is organised 
according to two principles: (a) every earlier member of the hierarchy is more 
general than its successor; (b) every later member is based on its predeces-
sor. Consequently, sociology assumes biology as its closest theoretical basis 
from the outset. Spencer applied this scheme in the most radical manner in 
his project of evolutionary sociology. It is very characteristic that Comte’s 
programme entirely excluded psychology. Th e Millian idea placed sociology 
(labelled, with characteristic English terminological extravagance, as “moral 
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science”) aft er psychology (Spencer agreed with Mill in this respect). In spite 
of the fact that the French and British understanding of sociology diff ered 
as far as the role of psychology was concerned, both were oriented toward 
empirical research as rooted in history and economics and a utilitarian ap-
proach to morality, going back to David Hume and Adam Smith. Anyway, ac-
cording to this tradition, sociology is a theoretical science and applies similar 
methods to natural science, although the former is less general. Yet generality, 
of greater or lesser degrees, does not constitute a constitutive mark of sci-
ence, because every theoretical discipline is general by defi nition. From this 
perspective, the English terminology, which strongly distinguishes science 
(= natural science) and the humanities, is an oddity. 
Th e classical humanities modelled by history, linguistics, archaeology, etc. 
inspired German thinkers dealing with methodology of science. However, 
they employed the term Wissenschaft  as generic and referred to all scientif-
ic fi elds in the academic sense. Two important distinctions were proposed 
in order to explain the methodological problems and peculiarities of social 
sciences and the humanities. Wilhelm Windelband, who established the Bad-
enian School of Neo-Kantianism, distinguished nomothetic sciences (nomo-
thetische Wissenschaft en) and idiographic sciences (idiographische Wissen-
schaft en). While the latter (history, archaeology, etc.) describe individual 
facts, the former (physics, chemistry, etc.) formulate general (universal) laws. 
Heinrich Rickert, Windelband’s successor in Heidelberg and another impor-
tant Neo-Kantian philosopher, supplemented this distinction by contrasting 
natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft en) and sciences on culture (Kulturwis-
senschaft en). According to Rickert, Windelband’s methodological dualism 
of two modes of research and types of statements should be correlated with 
the subject matter of particular sciences. Rickert maintained that the strict 
parallelism between the method of humanities and their subject is not acci-
dental. Individual facts are also non-recurrent. Th is feature imposes essential 
limitations on all attempts to formulate strict universal and causal laws about 
cultural phenomena. So-called historical generalisations are the maximum 
as far as general statements about the subject matter of the humanities are 
concerned. 
Th is scheme required a closer characterisation of the method of Kulturwis-
senschaft en. Th e most popular idea was off ered by Wilhelm Dilthey, who was 
infl uenced by Hegel. Dilthey introduced (or rather developed) the concept of 
Verstehen (understanding) as an operation indispensable for accounting for 
culture as the spiritual reality. Hence, Kulturwissenschathen were identifi ed 
as Geisteswissenschaft en, that is, sciences about the spirit. Since this terminol-
ogy is fairly odd in English, German words are frequently used as technical 
terms in philosophical and methodological English. In fact, the concept of 
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Verstehen was never explained in a satisfactory manner. On the other hand, 
many theoreticians of the humanities think that investigations in this area 
require a special method allowing us to understand human actions and their 
products. In particular, someone pretending to understand cultural phenom-
ena must capture values by using the method called Einfühlung (English has 
no adequate term as a counterpart for this German word). Leaving aside the 
question of what precisely Verstehen and Einfühlung are, let me conclude 
that the beginning of sociology in Germany was much more philosophical 
and speculative than in France and Great Britain. A practical result of this 
ideological (in the sense of the fundamental ideas behind) commitment of 
German sociology is consistent in some delay of its involvement in empirical 
research. Anyway, the Windelband-Rickert-Dilthey approach to Kulturwis-
senschaft en did not favour sociology as an empirical theory of society. In fact, 
the fi rst German sociologists came to sociology from philosophy and repre-
sented Neo-Kantianism, the philosophical stronghold in German academic 
life, in their general views. Max Weber was perhaps the most notable example 
in this respect. 
Th e principal task of Th on’s paper was to provide information about so-
ciological works undertaken in Germany. In addition, he decided to include 
his own views related to general sociological matters. Th is feature of his paper 
can be considered as additional evidence to suggest that he may have regard-
ed “Th e Present State of Sociology in Germany” as a preparatory step toward 
his eventual Habilitationsschrift . 
In what follows, I will mostly concentrate on general issues considered 
in Th on’s paper, particularly on methodological ones. He was of course very 
much familiar with Neo-Kantianism and, as student of Simmel, with the 
methodology of the humanities proposed by this philosophical movement. 
On the other hand, in his sociological works Simmel consciously tried to 
overcome the limitations imposed by the tradition of Kulturwissenschaft en 
in Germany. His famous study of the theory of money, namely the book 
Philosophie des Geldes (the title is misleading because this work is more so-
cio-economic than philosophical), although published three years later (in 
1900) than Th on’s paper appeared, developed ideas well known among stu-
dents in Berlin. Th us, Simmel can be considered as one of the main fi gures in 
the process of German transition from philosophical Kulturwissenschaft en to 
sociology in its contemporary sense. Although Th on was not uncritical (see 
below) of his teacher, he documented this development, and perhaps Simmel 
recommended this direction of “Th e Present State of Sociology in Germany.”
Th on begins with complaints that sociology as a theoretical social sci-
ence hardly exists in Germany, unlike in France and England. Th us, Th on 
clearly saw that German sociology was considerably delayed in its advance-
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ment compared with its state in other countries. He explains this situation by 
pointing out that Comte and Spencer, identifi ed as the founding fathers of 
this fi eld, have a bad press in Germany. Th on does not mention Mill in this 
context, probably because he (Mill) was considered rather as a philosopher, 
mostly working in logic and ethics. Th on’s remarks are rooted in general re-
jection of positivistic philosophy in Germany; the anti-positivistic attitude 
was strongly present in Neo-Kantianism. A careful reader of “Th e Present 
State of Sociology in Germany” can also observe that the rivalry of German 
science with the achievements of other nations is behind his complaints 
about the development of sociology in Germany. In this respect he was fol-
lowing the prevailing opinion among Neo-Kantians that Kant’s philosophy is 
the best possible and this evaluation can be extended to science as a whole. 
Certainly, Th on was very far from the nationalistic ideology that to some 
extent surrounded German culture at the time, but he was educated in this 
spirit and expressed it, even unconsciously. 
At the end of his paper, Th on mentions that Simmel, Ernst Grosse in Leip-
zig and Paul Barth in Freiburg are the only persons lecturing on sociolo-
gy in Germany. Th is observation is taken by Th on as a justifi cation for his 
evaluation of German sociology being delayed in comparison to the French 
and English varieties. Interesting and even surprising is that Th on does not 
mention Ferdinand Tönnies among professional sociologists, although the 
latter is commonly considered to be the greatest German sociologist. Tön-
nies was the fi rst president of the German Sociological Association, elected in 
1909, but well known for his earlier work in social theory. On the other hand, 
Th on described Tönnies’ ideas at some length. As a matter of fact, Tönnies 
also studied in Berlin under Paulsen and Wagner, who were later teachers of 
Th on. Hence, it is not surprising that Th on knew Tönnies’ work quite well. It 
is diffi  cult to explain why Tönnies’ name is not present in Th on’s list of lec-
turers of sociology. Perhaps the reason was a formal one regarding academic 
matters, namely that although Tönnies had been able to lecture since 1881 
(when he obtained his Habilitation and veniam legend, the right to lecture at 
universities), he did not conduct classes in sociology at that time. Even more 
surprising is the fact that Th on completely overlooked the work of Max We-
ber, who was very active at that time, fi rst in Freiburg (1894−1896) and then 
in Heidelberg. 
Th on’s situation in describing German sociology was not easy. Th e main 
diffi  culty was the fact that no advanced empirical sociological research was 
available in Germany around 1895, although German scholars made sever-
al remarks on history, politics, economics (for instance, the division of la-
bor; Th on reports the polemics between Gustav Schmoller and Karl Bücher 
concerning this problem). Hence, early sociological works concerned rather 
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various theoretical models of social life than empirically investigated facts. 
France and England were much more advanced in this respect than Germa-
ny, as I have already noted. Hence, Th on mostly presented the general views 
on sociology circulating in Germany. However, on the other hand, infl uenced 
by Simmel, he tried to keep a purely sociological point of view. He conscious-
ly avoids any reference to economic factors or political experiments, but, as 
the content of his paper shows, he is not successful in this (and could not be 
at the time). Th on criticises several writers, including Tönnies, for confusing 
philosophy and sociology; perhaps this was the reason that Tönnies was not 
considered to be a sociologist. However, mixing philosophy and sociology 
was a common practice in Germany at the end of the 19th century. 
Th on considered sociology as a legitimate scientifi c fi eld and insisted very 
strongly that it could not be rejected a priori. On the other hand, to be a suc-
cessful scientifi c discipline, sociology must defi ne its subject in a satisfactory 
manner. According to Th on, Comte and Spencer (whom he considered to 
be the main representatives of French and English sociology respectively) 
regarded sociology too widely, because their views resulted in the conception 
that everything belongs to sociology. Th on argues that this defi nition con-
verts sociology into metaphysics. Th is is an interesting argument, because it 
condemns positivistic thinkers who strongly declare their anti-metaphysical 
attitude for being committed to it. Ironically, Th on, a Neo-Kantian philos-
opher, formulated a positivistic argument against positivism. Incidentally, 
similar arguments against positivism were advanced by many thinkers, not 
only those who belonged to the Neo-Kantian camp. In particular, Comte’s 
idea of three stages in human history or Spencer’s evolutionism were (and 
still are) qualifi ed as typical metaphysical (or historiosophical) constructions, 
speculative and not subjected to empirical confi rmation by observable em-
pirical facts.
Th on himself defi nes sociology as the theory of group-formation and so-
cialisation. He admitted himself that his defi nition combines evolutionism, 
some views of Rickert concerning the role of groups in the historical process 
and Comte’s idea of social dynamics as opposed to social statics. As far as the 
tasks of sociology are concerned, they are formal-descriptive (in Simmel’s 
sense) and normative-axiological. Th e latter are considered by Th on as pre-
paratory. Sociology should also take into account the motivations of human 
acts. Th is observation leads to the second defi nition of sociology as investigat-
ing forms and motivations of human associations. Although Th on followed 
Simmel in many respects, he expressed some reservations concerning the 
views of his teacher. In particular, according to Th on, Simmel overestimates 
the formal aspects of society and neglects the content of human interactions. 
Th is leads to Th on’s claims that the forms of human aff airs cannot be inves-
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tigated without taking their content into account. Th on adds, however, that 
in his concrete remarks Simmel properly sees the relation between form and 
content; an adequate sociology must investigate forces, forms and develop-
ment of socialisation. Regardless of whether or not Th on’s evaluation of Sim-
mel was somehow moderated by the generosity of a pupil toward his teacher, 
it can be interpreted as a departure from Neo-Kantianism. All representatives 
of this movement, of course, infl uenced by the master from Königsberg, at-
tributed the major importance to formal features of all phenomena, including 
human aff airs. Clearly, some Neo-Kantians, like Simmel, who were interested 
in or working on genuine sociological problems, considerably tempered their 
formal inclinations by seeing substantial features of society. However, Th on’s 
departure from Kantian formalism to a more balanced dialectics of form and 
content seems to be deeper than that represented by a typical sociologist with 
a Neo-Kantian background. 
Th on is perfectly well aware that philosophical problems arise within so-
ciology, although he considers them as not belonging to this fi eld (one could 
say, using more contemporary language, that they are meta-sociological). He 
mentions or considers several questions of this kind, for instance, the nature 
of sociological knowledge (he follows the idea of the critique of knowledge 
in a Kantian sense, but without sharing Kant’s epistemology). In general, 
Th on rejects various philosophical reductions occurring in the literature of 
this time. He questions materialistic reductions (the historical materialism of 
Marx, Mehring, Kautsky), arguing that culture is not reducible to econom-
ic factors. Similarly, Th on criticises idealistic proposals (Stammler, Barth) as 
overlooking real social facts. He considers idealism and materialism in soci-
ology as genuine metaphysics going far beyond the scientifi c possibilities of 
sociological analysis. As far as materialism is concerned, he sees an analogy 
to reduction of psychology to physiology. Evolutionism is criticised for or-
ganicism and reduction of sociology to biology. Th on also rejects some theo-
ries of internal social organisation as inadequate. Th is qualifi cation concerns 
the anarchism represented by Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche.
 Th on proposes (following Simmel to some extent) that sociologists 
should investigate motivational processes and economic facts as parallel (an 
analogy with psycho-physical parallelism). He argues that nature and histo-
ry are equally real, but grasped diff erently via rational categories (Rickert’s 
infl uence). Consequently, sociological laws are not worse than natural ones 
(a novelty in German philosophy at that time, at least in Kantian tradition). 
As for socialisation, Th on proposes a balance between collectivism and in-
dividualism. Summing up, Th on intended to outline a project for sociology 
ascribing to it a fairly autonomous character as a particular science. Th is was 
a compromise between the two traditions of sociology mentioned earlier. To 
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some extent, and with some exceptions, Th on’s paper did not present more 
concrete German sociological works. It is diffi  cult to explain this fact from 
the contemporary perspective. It seems that Th on was suffi  ciently acquainted 
with German sociology about 1897, although, as we noted earlier, he over-
looked some important fi gures, such as Weber. He reported on some works 
that are completely forgotten today (Schmoller, Bücher, Bruno Wille). On 
the other hand, although Th on programmatically regarded meta-sociological 
problems and general models of society as not belonging to sociology proper, 
their popularity among German scholars considering themselves to be sociol-
ogists made it impossible to ignore related discussions. Once again, Th on wit-
nessed the transition of a part of philosophy into sociology and, consciously 
or not, concentrated on the philosophical-sociological borderline. Looking 
at Th on’s study from a present-day point of view, it rather concerned German 
social philosophy at the end of the 19th century than sociology proper. 
